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COMMENTS
“TOUCHING THE CONCERNS” OF KIOBEL: CORPORATE
LIABILITY AND JURISDICTIONAL REMEDIES IN
RESPONSE TO KIOBEL VS. ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM
Chinyere Kimberly Ikegbunam*
Introduction
Esther Kiobel is doomed to remember the events that took the life of her
husband and gave rise to the April 2013, United States Supreme Court
decision Kiobel vs. Royal Dutch Petroleum. She alleges her adversaries
were none other than the Nigerian Government, in a concerted effort with
Royal Dutch Petroleum (Shell), one of Nigeria’s largest oil producers. Mrs.
Kiobel’s sole purpose for bringing the suit was to “hold . . . Shell
responsible for the alleged crimes committed against [her and her family]
and the rest of humanity.”1
Mrs. Kiobel claims that Shell aided and abetted the Nigerian government
in acts of terrorism and extrajudicial killings of Nigerian citizens including
her husband, Dr. Barimen Kiobel.2 This Comment sheds light on the events
which triggered Mrs. Kiobel’s suit, and discusses the available remedies to
her and her family following the Supreme Court’s decision.
In April 2013, the United States Supreme Court determined that
corporations could only be held liable for human rights violations which
“touch and concern” the territory of the United States with “sufficient
force.”3 The case involved Nigerian citizens of the oil-rich Ogoniland in the
Niger Delta Region of Nigeria.4 The Nigerian citizens brought suit against
* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. I am grateful to
Professors Owen L. Anderson and Evelyn Aswad as well as Nazareth M. Haysbert for their
insightful comments. I would also like to thank my parents, Chief Osita Ikegbunam
(Obiwelugo of Eziowelle) and Lolo Gina Ikegbunam (Gold Chinyelu Diya), and my siblings
Stephanie, Kingsley, Nicole, and Stanley for their unyielding love and support. Finally, I
give my heartfelt thanks to Deans Joseph Harroz, Jr., Scott L. Palk, and Casey T. Delaney
for selflessly investing in my life and career and for always believing in me.
1. John Donovan, Email Received from Esther Kiobel of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell,
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC.COM (Apr. 24, 2013), http://royaldutchshellplc.com/2013/04/24/
email-received-from-esther-kiobel-of-kiobel-v-royal-dutch-shell/.
2. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662 (2013).
3. Id. at 1669.
4. Id. at 1662.
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Shell, alleging its affiliates assisted the Nigerian government in committing
violations against the Law of Nations in Nigeria.5 The unanimous Supreme
Court decision has left much uncertainty regarding whether foreign
individuals can bring alleged Law of Nations violations to United States
district courts.6
This Comment seeks to answer three questions brought forth by the
Kiobel decision. Firstly, what does it mean to “touch and concern” the
territory of the United States, and to do so with “sufficient force”?
Secondly, do any viable remedies remain for Mrs. Kiobel against Shell,
should she continue to seek relief? Finally, what precautions can be taken to
prevent the events that led to this suit from occurring again?
Part I of this Comment analyzes the Kiobel decision and offers a
definition to Justice Kennedy’s “touch and concern” language. Part II
suggests solutions to the Kiobel Petitioners, and explores the available
remedies for suit under Nigerian domestic law, international law, the law of
the Netherlands, and United Kingdom law. Finally, Part III of this
Comment offers mechanisms to improve transparency between the Nigerian
government and Nigerian citizens, especially those most affected by
petroleum operations.
I. Factual Background
The twelve Kiobel Petitioners, led by Esther Kiobel, were citizens of
Ogoniland, a 250-square-mile area located in the Niger delta of Nigeria.7
Respondents, Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and Shell Transport and
Trading Company, p.l.c., were incorporated in the Netherlands and
England, respectively.8 The suit involved actions of a Shell affiliate, Shell
Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd. (SPDC), which is
incorporated in Nigeria, and engages in oil exploration and production in
Ogoniland.9
The citizens in Ogoniland began to protest oil development of their land,
particularly the adverse environmental effects of SPDC’s practices.10 At the
forefront of the protests were outspoken playwrights and authors Dr.
Barimen Kiobel and Ken Saro-Wira, as well as leaders of the “popular
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id.
Id. at 1669 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 1662 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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grassroots movement, known as the Movement for the Survival of the
Ogoni People (“MOSOP.”)”11 The Petitioners’ complaint alleged
“throughout the early 1990’s, . . . [the] Nigerian military and police forces
attacked Ogoni villages, beating, raping, killing, and arresting residents and
destroying and looting property.”12 Both Dr. Kiobel and Ken Saro-Wira
were killed by the Nigerian government for their roles in the MOSOP
protests.13
Mrs. Kiobel vividly recalls being “stripped naked, tortured, and locked
up twice, while [her] husband and the rest of the Ogoni 9[14] were maimed,
strangled, killed and acidized” by the Nigerian government.15 Her claims
were corroborated by affidavits of key witnesses, including fellow protester
Boniface Ejiogu.16
The Petitioners were later granted political asylum in the United States.17
Subsequently, they brought suit against the Respondents under the Alien
Torts Statute, claiming violations of the Law of Nations.
A. The Alien Torts Statute
The Kiobel Petitioners sought relief under the Alien Torts Statute
(ATS),18 which provides: “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law
of nations . . . .”19 Since its inception, the ATS has rarely been used and has
been difficult for the courts to apply.20 The ATS was interpreted very

11. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No.
10-1491).
12. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662.
13. Memorandum from Nazareth M. Haysbert on the Current Scope of the Alien Tort
Statute Post Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (2013) (on file with author).
14. Group of nine activists from the Ogoni region in Nigeria that included Ken SaroWiwa, Saturday Dobee, Nordu Eawu, Daniel Gbooko, Paul Levera, Felix Naute, Baribor
Bera, Barimen Kiobel, and John Kpuine, who were executed by hanging.
15. Donovan, supra note 1.
16. Letter from Esther Kiobel to Author (n.d.) (concerning statement written by Mr.
Boniface Ejiogu) (on file with author). Ejiogu’s statement further described Esther’s
detainment and also alleges among other accusations that he was promised “the sum of fifty
million naira” to cease involvements in the Ogoni case. Id.
17. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663.
18. Id. at 1662.
19. Alien Torts Claims Acts, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
20. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663 (“[T]he ATS was invoked twice in the late 18th
century, but then only once more over the next 167 years.”).
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narrowly in early case law.21 Early courts limited the ATS to “‘three
principle offenses against the law of nations’[:] . . . violation of safe
conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.”22
However, court interpretation of the ATS eventually broadened enough to
give Mrs. Kiobel hope that the ATS would allow adjudication of her claim
in a United States court.
Filartiga v. Pena- Irala provided the courts with their first opportunity to
interpret the reach of the ATS. In this case, the Second Circuit established
that United States’ courts have “jurisdiction over claims brought by foreign
plaintiffs for violations of the law of nations that occurred outside U.S.
borders if the defendant was found and was provided a valid service of
process in the U.S.”23 The Paraguayan plaintiffs in Filartiga filed suit in
New York district court against a Paraguayan defendant,24 “a former
government official of Paraguay,” who was accused of “kidnap[ping] and
tortur[ing]” the plaintiff’s son to death.25 After allegedly killing the
plaintiff’s son in Paraguay, the defendant entered the United States, where
he was served process by the plaintiffs.26 The District Court for the Eastern
District of New York initially dismissed the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.27
In reversing the district court, the Second Circuit held that the tortious
conduct of the defendant “constituted a violation of the [L]aw of
[N]ations.”28 Filartiga also held that, “whenever an alleged torturer is found
within the borders of the U.S., the ATS grants jurisdiction.”29 Although
Filartiga was brought against an individual, it is said to have eventually
“opened the floodgates” for ATS litigation against corporations as well.30

21. Yihe Yang, Corporate Civil Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: The Practical
Implications from Kiobel, 40 W. ST. U. L. REV. 195, 196 (2013).
22. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1661 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 694
(2004)).
23. Yang, supra note 21, at 197 (quoting Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d
Cir. 1980)).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. (quoting Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878).
27. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880.
28. Yang, supra note 21, at 197.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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Over twenty years later, the Ninth Circuit heard the first ATS case
against a corporate defendant.31 In Doe v. Unocal, residents of Southeast
Asia brought suit against Unocal Corporation, a subsidiary of Union Oil
Company of California.32 The plaintiffs alleged Unocal aided and abetted
the Myanmar Military in forcing them “under threat of violence[] to work
on and serve as porters” for Unocal’s pipeline project.33 During this time,
the Military subjected the plaintiffs to “acts of murder, rape, and torture.”34
The district court determined that private corporations are subject to the
ATS for human rights violations.35 Unocal was deemed liable under the
ATS for subjecting the plaintiffs to rape and murder; however, they were
not held liable for torture.36 The court based its determination on
Prosecutor v. Furundzija, where the court held that “knowing practical
assistance [or] encouragement . . . which has a substantial effect on the
perpetration of the crime,” is a “standard for aiding and abetting . . . under
the [ATS].”37 Doe was settled before the Ninth Circuit could fully
adjudicate the dispute.38 Despite this, Doe is said to have paved the way for
ATS litigation against multi-national corporations.39
Two years after Doe, the Supreme Court, in Sosa v. United States,
limited the use of the ATS before United States courts. In Sosa, the
Supreme Court ruled the ATS did not permit private individuals to bring
suit against foreign citizens in United States courts for crimes committed in
other countries in violation of the Law of Nations.40
Sosa was based on actions that took place in Mexico.41 The plaintiffs, the
United States and Humberto Alvarez-Machain et. al, brought suit against
31. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), on reh’g en banc sub nom.
John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
32. Id. at 937–38.
33. Id. at 939.
34. Id.
35. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 891 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
36. Doe I, 395 F.3d at 955. Many of the plaintiff-appellant’s claims could amount to
torture involving victims other than Plaintiffs. Because the plaintiff-appellants did not form a
class action with victims, the Ninth Circuit dismissed Doe’s torture claims. Id.
37. Id. at 954 (quoting Prosecutor v. Furudzija, 38 I.L.M. 317 (1999) (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia, decision of Dec. 10, 1998), available at 1999 WL 363473)).
38. Id. at 953.
39. Yang, supra note 21, at 198 (citing Donald J. Kochan, The Political Economy of the
Production of Customary International Law: The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations
in U.S. Courts, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 240, 242 (2004)).
40. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
41. Id. at 697.
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defendant, Jose Francisco Sosa, for violently abducting Alvarez-Machain
who offered aid to Enrique Camarna-Salazar.42 Camarna-Salazar was an
agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration who was tortured and
murdered by the Mexican government.43 It was alleged that “Sosa[]
abducted Alvarez from his house, held him overnight in a motel, and
brought him [on a] private plane to El Paso, Texas, where [Alvarez] was
arrested . . . .”44
Alvarez-Machain brought a false arrest claim against the United States
under the Federal Torts Claim Act (FCTA) as well as an ATS claim against
Sosa for violating the Law of Nations.45 The Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of
Alvarez-Machain, and Sosa appealed.46
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s judgment in favor of
Alvarez-Machain, and held the ATS, “by its grant of jurisdiction,
authorized the federal courts to recognize federal common law causes of
action to redress violations of . . . international norms.”47 In addition to
further defining the extent of grounds for ATS claims, Sosa served as the
leading authority for the Kiobel decision.
Although the preceding case law helped to clarify the ATS, the Supreme
Court would later make its unprecedented determination in Kiobel,
drastically limiting the applicability of the ATS. Before Kiobel, the
requirements of bringing suit under the ATS could be simplified to: “(1) the
plaintiff must be an ‘alien,’ (2) the defendant must have committed a ‘tort,’
and (3) the ‘tort’ must violate either a treaty, or the ‘law of nations.’”48
The alien status requirement under the ATS was never at issue in ATS
cases. An alien is someone who “relat[es], belong[s to], or ow[es]
allegiance to another country or government.”49 The second and third
elements of the ATS require the defendant to commit a tort in violation of a
treaty or the Law of Nations.50 For a defendant to violate the Law of
Nations, their offense must be “definable, obligatory, and universally
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 698.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 699.
47. Brief for Petitioner at 1, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No.
10-1491).
48. Yang, supra note 21, at 198 (citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2nd Cir.
1995)).
49. Definition of Alien, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/diction
ary/alien (last visited May 10, 2014).
50. Yang, supra note 21, at 198.
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condemned.”51 Initially, violations of the Law of Nations under the ATS
was limited to “violation[s] of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of
ambassadors, and piracy.”52 However, today courts have the discretion to
interpret the ATS based on laws existing in the world today.53
The issue of corporate liability under the ATS remains somewhat of a
mystery. Doe allowed a claim to be brought against Unocal, a corporation.54
The majority in Doe reasoned because Unocal knew or should have known
its conduct would assist the Myanmar military in committing human rights
violations, it should be held liable as a corporation.55 However, before the
Ninth Circuit could make its determination, “the parties settled the case.”56
Thus, Doe never formally addressed the issue of corporate liability.
Because Sosa “dealt with claims against individual person . . . rather than a
corporation,” prior to Kiobel, the Supreme Court had not had the
opportunity to rule on corporate liability under the ATS.57
Kiobel presented the Court with a unique question of determining
corporate liability under the ATS.58 The Kiobel decision was important not
only for its paramount determination on the ATS, but also for the important
questions it raised for alien victims of human rights violations, corporate
defendants, and foreign sovereigns alike.
B. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
The Kiobel case brought about the first opportunity for the Supreme
Court to rule on corporate liability under the ATS. Mrs. Kiobel and the
other Petitioners “allege[d] that [the Shell companies] aided and abetted
these atrocities by . . . providing the Nigerian forces with food,
transportation, and compensation, as well as allowing the Nigerian military
to use respondents’ property as a staging ground for attacks.”59 Documents

51. Id. at 199 (quoting Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980)).
52. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1661 (2013) (quoting Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 694 (2004).
53. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881.
54. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), on reh’g en banc sub nom.,
John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
55. Id. at 946.
56. Yang, supra note 21, at 200.
57. Id. at 202.
58. Id.
59. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662–63 (2013).
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in Mrs. Kiobel’s possession revealed an approval by SPDC to use violent
force against protesters,60 and a request for arms.61
Shortly after the alleged human rights violations, the Petitioners moved
to the United States, were granted political asylum, and became legal
United States residents.62 The Petitioners filed their suit in the District
Court for the Southern District of New York.63 They brought their claim
under the ATS, alleging:
[R]espondents violated the law of nations by aiding and abetting
the Nigerian Government in committing (1) extrajudicial
killings; (2) crimes against humanity; (3) torture and cruel
treatment; (4) arbitrary arrest and detention; (5) violations of the
rights to life, liberty, security, and association; (6) forced exile;
and (7) property destruction.64
The first, fifth, sixth, and seventh claims were dismissed by the district
court, because the claims did not violate the Law of Nations.65 The Second
Circuit dismissed the complaint entirely, “reasoning that the law of nations
does not recognize corporate liability.”66 The Second Circuit based its
dismissal on the notion that “corporate liability under the ATS [was] an
issue of subject matter jurisdiction,” and “placed great emphasis on . . . [a
lack of] case law holding corporations accountable directly under
international law for violations of international human rights norms . . . .”67
The Petitioners appealed, arguing “the Second Circuit erred by treating
the issue of corporate liability as an issue of subject matter jurisdiction,”
and explained “[n]othing in the . . . ATS suggests that the drafters meant to

60. Letter from the Managing Director, Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. of Nig. Limited to the
Inspector General of the Nigeria Police (n.d.) (stating that on July 27, 1994, “approval was
given for [SPDC] to import some arms and ammunition for the use of Police Force to
enhance the security of . . . oil installations.”).
61. Letter from the Managing Director, Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. of Nig. Limited to the
Inspector General of the Nigeria Police Force (Aug. 17, 1994) (requesting additional
firearms and ammunition).
62. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Brief for Petitioner at 4–5, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659
(2013) (No. 10-1491).
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exclude entities from the tort liability recognized in the statute.”68 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on October 17, 2011.69
The Kiobel decision hinged upon “whether and under what
circumstances courts may recognize a cause of action under the Alien Tort
Statute, for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of
a sovereign other than the United States.”70 Specifically, the question before
the Court in Kiobel was “whether a claim may reach conduct occurring in
the territory of a foreign sovereign,” not merely whether an ATS claim was
properly asserted.
The Court ultimately held in favor of Respondents, affirming the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.71 In determining the applicability of the
ATS to Law of Nations violations occurring outside of the United States,
the Court, led by Justice Roberts, sought to determine the legislative intent
of the ATS’s scope. The Court recognized the opaqueness of the statue
which “does not expressly provide any causes of action.”72 However, it
found the statute was not meant to be “stillborn,”73 but instead enacted to
“provide a cause of action for [a] modest number of international law
violations.”74
In absence of any clear language granting jurisdiction to foreign
petitioners for actions taking place outside of the United States, the Court
relied upon the presumption against extraterritorial application.75 This
canon of statutory interpretation provides “[w]hen a statute gives no clear
indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none . . . .”76 The
presumption against extraterritoriality is often invoked whenever an act of
Congress applies abroad.77 Thus, since the ATS does not provide any clear
indication of its extraterritorial application, the Court reasoned it could not
68. Id. at 8-9.
69. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, SCOTUS BLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/
case-files/cases/kiobel-v-royal-dutch-petroleum/ (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
70. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662.
71. Id. at 1669.
72. Id. at 1663.
73. Id.
74. Id. (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004)).
75. Id. at 1664.
76. Id. (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 256 (2010)).
77. Id.; see, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 246 (1991) (“These
cases present the issue whether Title VII applies extraterritoriality to regulate the
employment practices of United States employers who employ United States citizens
abroad.”); Morrison, 561 U.S. at 254 (noting that the question of extraterritorial application
was a “merits question,” not a question of jurisdiction).
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be used to grant jurisdiction to the petitioner’s claims, which took place in
Nigeria.
Petitioners argued that even if the presumption applied, “Congress . . .
[could] indicate that it intends federal law to apply to conduct occurring
abroad.”78 Petitioners further contended, “because Congress surely intended
the ATS to provide jurisdiction for actions against pirates, it necessarily
anticipated the statute would apply to conduct occurring abroad.”79
However, the Supreme Court countered, finding neither any evidence
within the text or historical background of the ATS to displace the
presumption against extraterritoriality.”80 The Supreme Court also rejected
the Petitioners’ argument that the ATS’ application to piracy is evidence of
its extraterritorial intent. The majority reasoned that applying the US law to
pirates “does not typically impose the sovereign will of the United States
onto conduct occurring within the territorial jurisdiction of another
sovereign.”81 This reason was consistent with the ATS’s policy of not
infringing on the rights of other nations.82 Thus, despite the Petitioners’
arguments, the Court held the canon against extraterritoriality applied.83
For cases after Kiobel, any claim brought under the ATS can only be
brought in United States courts if they “touch and concern the territory of
the United States . . . with sufficient force to displace the presumption
against extraterritorial application.”84 This requirement is arguably the most
controversial language of the opinion. Kiobel’s holding begs the questions
of what “touch and concern” means, and what constitutes sufficient force.
Justice Kennedy admits the Court’s decision left “open a number of
significant questions” pertaining to the reach and interpretation of the Alien
Torts Statute.85
Both Justice Alito and Justice Breyer attempted to answer these
questions in their concurring opinions. Justice Alito’s concurrence suggests
78. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665; see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1091(e) (2012) (providing
jurisdiction over the offense of genocide “regardless of where the offense is committed” if
the alleged offender is, among other things, “present in the United States”).
79. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1667.
80. Id. at 1666; see Morrison, 561 U.S. at 265 (noting that “[a]ssuredly contact can be
consulted” in determining whether a cause of action applies abroad).
81. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1667.
82. Id. at 1664; see Morrison, 561 U.S. at 256; Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550
U.S. 437, 454 (2007) (“[T]he presumption that the United States law governs domestically
but does not rule the world applies . . . .”).
83. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
84. Id.
85. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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that ATS causes of action should only fall outside the scope of the
presumption against extraterritoriality when the action (1) meets “Sosa’s
requirements of definiteness and acceptance” and (2) actually occurs within
the United States.86
Justice Breyer concurred with the Court’s conclusion, but not its
reasoning.87 He proposed that instead of using the presumption against
extraterritorial jurisdiction, the ATS should apply in three specific
instances: “where (1) the alleged tort occurred on American soil, (2) the
defendant is an American national, or (3) the defendant’s conduct
substantially and adversely affects an important American national
interest . . . .”88
Despite the efforts of the concurring opinions, the Kiobel decision left
many important questions unresolved. The following sections of this
Comment discusses the Supreme Court and district court’s application of
Kiobel.
C. Supreme Court Treatment of ATS Claims Post-Kiobel
After the Supreme Court’s decision, Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit had the first opportunity to apply the “touch and concern” language
of Kiobel. On the same day as the Kiobel decision, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in the Ninth Circuit case, Daimler AG v. Bauman.89
Daimler addressed the issue of whether personal jurisdiction could be
exercised over a foreign corporation solely because its domestic subsidiary
maintained continous activities within the forum state.90
The petitioners in Daimler brought a claim under the ATS, alleging that
one of Daimler Chrysler’s subsidiaries, Mercedes Benz Argentina, aided
and abetted Argentinian security forces in Argentina’s Dirty War by
torturing, killing, kidnapping, and detaining the petitioners and their
relatives.91 The appellate court dismissed the claim for lack of personal
jurisdiction.92 The Supreme Court ultimately held that the petitioners’ claim

86. Id. at 1670 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 1670–71 (Breyer, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 1671.
89. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 917 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d sub
nom. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 911.
92. Id. at 917.
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was improperly brought under the ATS, and could not serve as a valid basis
for personal jurisdiction.93
Again on the same day as Kiobel, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth
Circuit’s ruling in Rio Tinto PLC v. Sarei. The Ninth Circuit permitted
corporate liability under the ATS, and found Rio Tinto could be sued under
the ATS for human rights abuses and thousands of deaths linked to
pollution cause by the company’s copper and gold mines in Papua New
Guinea.94 The Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for additional
rulings in light of the Court’s decision in Kiobel.95
D. District Courts’ Application of Kiobel
The district courts also moved to rule in light of the Kiobel decision.
Most of the litigation in district courts has involved human rights violations
taking place entirely abroad.96 In these instances, the presumption against
extraterritoriality has prevented plaintiffs from bringing suit.97 Conversely,
district courts have allowed claims brought under the ATS for claims with
strong enough connections to “touch and concern” the United States with
sufficient force.
In Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, the district court determined that
Kiobel’s “touch and concern . . . with sufficient force” requirement was
satisfied by the defendants actions, which took place in the United States.98
The defendant was charged with planning and managing a campaign of
repression in Uganda from his Massachusetts residence.99 The district court
for Massachusetts applied the ATS by distinguishing Kiobel in two ways.
93. Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 750.
94. Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, judgment
vacated sub nom. Rio Tinto, PLC v. Sarei, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (U.S. 2013).
95. Rio Tinto PLC, 133 S. Ct. at 1995.
96. Fotso v. Republic of Cameroon, No. 6:12 CV 1215-TC, 2013 WL 3006338, at *7
(D. Or. June 11, 2013) (dismissing Plaintiff’s ATS claims for lack of jurisdiction in less than
a paragraph based on the presumption against extraterritoriality enforced in Kiobel).
97. See Al Shimari v. CACI Intern, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 2d 857 (E.D. Va. 2013) (holding
that the court lacked jurisdiction over claims by four Iraqi citizens against private security
company CACI Premier Technologies, because the acts giving rise to Plaintiff’s injuries
occurred exclusively on foreign soil and outside the territory of the United States); see also
Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2013) (dismissing plaintiff’s ATS claim that
alleged that South African subsidiaries of three U.S.-based companies, Ford, IBM, and
DaimlerChrysler, aided and abetted the apartheid government of South Africa in acts of
rape, torture, and extrajudicial killings against South African citizens because the actions
took place in another sovereign).
98. Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 322 (D. Mass. 2013).
99. Id. at 309.
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Firstly, the defendant’s conduct in Sexual Minorities Uganda was carried
out by an American citizen.100 Secondly, although the harm endured by the
plaintiffs occurred in Uganda, nearly all of the defendant’s conduct took
place in the United States.101 Consequently, the claims in Sexual Minorities
Uganda were properly brought under the ATS and “touched and concerned
the territory of the United States” with enough force to displace the
presumption against extraterritoriality.
Given the response from the Supreme Court and district courts following
Kiobel, it appears that United States courts are moving towards restricting
extraterritorial application of human rights claims under the ATS.
E. Defining What It Means to “Touch and Concern” with “Sufficient
Force”
As of yet, the Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to clearly
define what it means to “touch and concern” the territory of the United
States with “sufficient force.”102 This portion of the Comment speculates as
to which claims would succeed under the ATS after Kiobel. Specifically, it
addresses (1) whether conduct occurring outside of the United States can
“touch” the United States; (2) whether the actions of a foreign subsidiary of
a United States corporation can satisfy the “touch” requirement of Kiobel;
(3) the type of conduct that could “concern” the United States, and (4) what
conduct constitutes “sufficient force.”
1. Absent a Clear Indication of Extraterritoriality, Can the ATS Apply To
Conduct Occurring Outside the United States?
The concurring opinions in Kiobel read a requirement of conduct
occurring within the territory of the United States into the “touch and
concern with sufficient force” language.103 Presumably, this interpretation
is consistent with the majority’s analysis of the intentions of the ATS. The
majority reasoned the fact the ATS applies to aliens does not make its
application automatically extraterritorial.104 Further, the majority opined the
petitioners were incorrect to contend that the “text, history, and purposes of
the ATS rebut” the presumption against extraterritoriality.105

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 321.
Id.
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 1665 (majority opinion).
Id.
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However, just six years after the enactment of the ATS, an opinion by
Attorney General William Bradford applied the ATS to a violation of the
Law of Nations that occurred in Sierra Leone.106 Bradford noted:
[T]here can be no doubt that the company or individuals who
have been injured by these acts of hostility have a remedy by a
civil suit in the courts of the United States; jurisdiction being
expressly given to these courts in all cases where an alien sues
for a tort only, in violation of the laws of nations, or a treaty of
the United States . . . .107
Bradford’s statements give a very clear indication that the ATS could
apply extraterritorially. Thus, the text and history of the ATS does not
clearly provide that conduct must occur within the territory of the United
States for jurisdictional relief.
Bradford’s statements provide support that the text and history of the
ATS does in at least one instance rebut the presumption against
extraterritorality. Thus, even without any clear indication of extraterritorial
intent, the text and history of the ATS support its application to conduct
occurring outside the United States.
2. Can the Actions of a Foreign Subsidiary of a United States
Corporation “Touch” the Territory of the United States?
The requirement of “touching” the territory of the United States could be
purely jurisdictional. Kiobel has taught us that the ATS will not support a
claim against a company merely because an entity of the company exists in
the United States. Subsidiaries of transnational oil company, such as SPDC,
are only subject to United States’ authority to the extent that its actions can
be attributed to the parent corporation as a whole. Many multinational oil
companies, including Shell, have been carefully crafted with multiple
subsidiaries, holding companies, and other entities “designed to minimize
accountability and liability for the impact of operations . . . .”108 As a result,
106. Beth Stephens, Extraterritoriality and Human Rights After Kiobel, 28 MD. J. INT'L
L. 256, 268 (2013), available at http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol28/iss1/
13; Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57, 59 (1795). For an extensive discussion of the
Bradford opinion, including contemporaneous documents confirming that Bradford knew
that the events had occurred in the territory of a foreign state, see Supplemental Brief of
Amici Curiae Professors of Legal History et al. in Support of Petitioners at 18–25, Kiobel,
133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491).
107. Stephens, supra note 106, at 268–69 (quoting Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y
Gen. at 59).
108. Id. at 260.
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a conjectural ATS case that adequately “touched” the United States would
likely involve a foreign corporation with a corporate structure that can
easily be traced to the United States. However, after the 2014 Daimler
decision, it is doubtful personal jurisdiction could be obtained over a multinational corporation with actions closely tying it to a United States
corporation, even if the claim was brought successfully under the ATS.
3. What Type of Conduct “Concerns” the Territory of the United States?
With respect to the majority’s analysis on the history of the ATS, it is
troubling to decipher which human rights violations “concern” the United
States. This could imply certain human rights violations are not important
enough to be heard in United States courts. By the broadest translation, any
human rights violation could concern the United States. Certain
comparative law theorists contend that violations of human rights by their
very nature are extraterritorial.109 International law prohibits human rights
violation regardless of where the conduct occurs.110 Universal norms have
no geographical limitations.111
Another broad reading of “concern” could be to interpret it as an effect
on the moral compass of the United States. When the United States was
first alerted of the abuses in Ogoniland, the Congressional Human Rights
Caucus wrote to Nigeria’s Head of State and Commander In Chief General
Sani Abacha. In the letter dated May 6, 1994, United States Chairman Tom
Lantos urged the Nigerian government to “protect the fundamental rights
of . . . the Ogoni people.”112 Under the moral definition of concern, it is
clear that Kiobel “concerned” the United States.
Under a more narrow interpretation of “concern,” a cause of action
would need strong enough ties to the United States without infringing on
the sovereignty of the jurisdiction in which the offenses took place.
Hypothetically, a case in which American citizens working abroad in a
United States embassy or a similar agency committed human rights
violations against foreigners could “concern” the United States. However
the facts in Kiobel make the “concern” language even more troubling. If
actions which took place in Nigeria, a country which has been one of the

109. Id. at 258 (“[U]niversal human rights . . . are ‘extraterritorial’ by definition.”).
110. Id. (listing genocide, slavery, and torture by name rather than human rights
violations generally).
111. Id.
112. Letter to General Sani Abacha from Congress, provided by Esther Kiobel to author
(n.d.) (on file with author).
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United States’ top five oil producers,113 involving Shell, a company which
has a strong presence in the United States, did not “concern” the United
States, it is difficult to imagine what could.
4. “With Sufficient Force”: The “Catch All” Provision of the Kiobel
Requirements
The “sufficient force” language appears to place another barrier on
claims brought under the ATS which clear the hurdles of “touching” and
“concerning” the United States. Hypothetically, an incident which violates
human rights norms and is considered to touch and concern the territory of
the United States could still fall short of Kiobel’s requirements. The
“sufficient force” language of the Kiobel decision is arguably the most
challenging. Future ATS cases will have to set the scopes and bounds of
when a claim which touches and concerns the United States does so with
sufficient force and when one does not.
Part I of this Comment’s analysis was strictly confined to the immediate
ramifications of the Kiobel decision. It offered an answer to what it means
to “touch and concern” and to do so with “sufficient force.” The questions
raised by Kiobel beg the bigger question on the state of human rights
violations under the ATS after Kiobel’s ruling. The concurring opinions
indicate to “touch and concern with sufficient force” requires actions to
take place in the United States. However theoretically there are a number of
scenarios in which actions occurring abroad meet Kiobel’s requirements
under the ATS. The scenarios offered above are of course mere conjecture.
In truth, only time will tell if the Supreme Court will expand or restrict the
scope of the ATS.
II. Possible Avenues for Remedy
The door to corporate liability for Shell Petroleum Development
Company’s actions has been tightly shut under the ATS. Despite this,
several avenues for relief for the Kiobel Petitioners and/or for holding Shell
accountable may still exist. Recall that the actions in Kiobel took place in
Nigeria, the Petitioners soon after moved to the United States, and that
Shell is incorporated in the United Kingdom and headquartered in the
Netherlands.114 In addition to bringing suit in the United States, the Kiobel
Petitioners had the opportunity to bring suit in Nigeria, the Netherlands, and
113. Shell at a Glance, SHELL.COM, http://www.shell.com/global/aboutshell/at-a-glance.
html (last visited May 10, 2014).
114. Id.
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the United Kingdom. This section explores all of the possible avenues for
holding Shell and similarly situated multi-national companies liable for
human rights violations.
A. Domestic Relief in Nigeria
[T]here is adequate evidence [to] expose Shell Petroleum
Development Company’s evil collaboration with Nigerian
government, which invariably poses legitimate and explainable
fear that if ever the case is referred to Nigeria, the oil giant will
be exonerated.
. . . It would discredit the United States Supreme Court’s
judgmental competence if this case is referred to Nigeria,
because even a child in the crèche knows that you cannot ask an
abuser to be his or her own judge.
–Esther Kiobel on relief under Nigerian law115
The Nigerian government itself allegedly carried out the heinous acts
against the Kiobel Petitioners,116 this likely created significant doubt in the
viability of relief in Nigerian courts.117 The Nigerian government showed a
strong interest in resolving the dispute at home. Upon the Petitioner’s grant
of jurisdiction in the United States, the Nigerian government expressed to
the U.S. Attorney General that
the suit would improperly assert “extra territorial jurisdiction of
a United States court . . . for events which took place in
Nigeria;” “jeopardize the on-going process initiated by the
current government to reconcile with the Ogoni people in
Nigeria;” “compromise the serious efforts by the Nigerian
Government to guarantee the safety of foreign investments,
including those of the United States;” and “gravely undermine
[Nigeria’s] sovereignty and place under strain the cordial

115. Esther Kiobel, Dr. Kiobel’s Widow: A Living Story of Shell Cruelty, OGONI-NIGER
DELTA NEWS, Sept. 17, 2012, http://news.huraclub.org/2012/09/17/dr-koibels-widow-livingstory-shells-cruelty-2/.
116. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1660 (2013).
117. See cases cited infra note 132.
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relations that exist with the Government of the United States of
America.”118
Considering the breadth of legal remedies for tortious conduct,
environmental damages, and human rights violations available under
Nigerian law alone, the Kiobel Petitioners may have been able to receive
justice in their own backyard.
Nigerian law provides relief for tortious conduct between Nigerian
citizens and multinational companies such as Shell.119 The Kiobel
Petitioners sought redress for numerous claims that could give rise to tort
liability under Nigerian law, including “arbitrary detention,” which could
give rise to a false imprisonment claim, “burning, destroying or looting
property,” which equates to trespass by chattels claims, and “beat[ing], and
flog[ing]” Petitioners, which could lead to assault and battery claims.120 If
these claims were successfully brought in a court in Nigeria, the Nigerian
Petitioners could receive “monetary compensation for damages or an
injunction” against the defendants.121 In addition to this, the parties could
have opted to settle the dispute privately.122
Nigerian courts also offer prohibitory injunctions. An order granting
prohibitory injunctive relief would prevent Shell from acting in a way that
would further harm the Petitioners. However, It is unlikely that the Kiobel
Petitioners (or similarly situated plaintiffs) would be granted injunctive
relief against Shell. Nigerian courts do not typically grant injunctive relief
against multinational oil companies.123 Instead, Nigerian courts have chosen
to forego injunctive relief against oil companies drilling in indigenous
communities to prevent “disturb[ing] the oil industry which is the main

118. Jonathan S. Massey, The Two That Got Away: First American Financial Corp. v.
Edwards and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 7 CHARLESTON L. REV. 63, 83 (2012)
(quoting Joint Appendix at 129, 130, 131, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct.
1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491)).
119. OLUFEMI AMAO, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
LAW: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 141 (2011).
120. Amended Class Action Complaint at 6, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133
S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491).
121. AMAO, supra note 119, at 129.
122. For example, Shell settled a similar case with the Ogoni people for numerous
tortious and human rights violations including the killing of activist Ken Saro-Wiwa. Ed
Pilkington, Shell Pays Out $15.5m over Saro-Wiwa Killing, GUARDIAN, June 8, 2009,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/08/nigeria-usa.
123. Jedrzej George Frynas, Legal Change in Africa: Evidence from Oil-Related
Litigation in Nigeria, 43 J. AFR. L. 121, 122 (1999).
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source of the country’s revenue.”124 However, Nigerian courts have granted
injunctive relief where companies have violated human rights under the
African Charter and other international law.125
The claims against Shell could also be brought under a theory of
negligence under Nigerian tort law. To sustain an action for negligence, the
Petitioners would have to show that the defendants (1) owed them a duty of
care, (2) breached that duty of care, and (3) the breach caused the
Petitioners’ injuries.126
In cases regarding multinational companies and indigenous populations,
the biggest challenge faced by a plaintiff is showing that the defendant
acted negligently, or did not act as a reasonable operator under the
circumstances. The Kiobel Petitioners could prove this element through two
angles. First, they could compare Shell’s operations in Ogoniland to other
operators in Nigeria; however, doing so would likely produce favorable
results for Shell. Unfortunately, the torts alleged here, which amount to
destruction of property and nuisance in the Nigerian community, are
commonplace practice by operators in Nigeria. Several multinational oil
companies drilling in Nigeria have also been subject to suit by indigenous
populations.127 Thus, it would be difficult to establish Shell’s practices in
Ogoniland are unreasonable compared to the practices of other operators in
Nigeria. Consequently, a negligence claim rooted in such a comparison is
unlikely to prevail.
Secondly, the Kiobel Petitioners could attempt to establish the
unreasonableness of Shell’s operations in Nigeria by contrasting Shell’s
operating practices in in Ogoniland to its operations in other countries. In
order to do this, the Kiobel Petitioners would first be tasked with
establishing that the comparison country is similarly situated to Ogoniland.
A non-exhaustive list of factors to be weighed into this comparison would
124. AMAO, supra note 119, at 130; see Irou v. Shell-BP, Unreported Suit No. W/89/71
(Warri High Ct. Nov. 26, 1973) (Nigeria) (plaintiff whose land, fish pond and creek had
polluted by Shell-BP operations was denied injunctive relief to restrain the company from
further pollution); see also Chinda v. Shell-BP, [1974] 2 RSLR 1 (Nigeria) (denying plaintiff
injunctive relief for illegal gas flaring against Shell-BP.)
125. AMAO, supra note 119, at 140; see Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. Nigeria,
Ltd., No. FHC/B/CS/53/05 (F.H.C. Nov. 14, 2005) (Nigeria) (granting injunctive relief
against plaintiff where court found that failure to grant relief would violate fundamental
human rights and international standards).
126. See Jill Cottrell, The Tort of Negligence in Nigeria, 17 J. AFR. L. 30 (1973)
(implying that Nigeria follows the traditional common law elements of negligence).
127. See Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 2010); Wiwa
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 91 (2d Cir. 2000).
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include: socioeconomic status, topical similarities, comparable natural
resources, etc.
A claim of negligence could also be brought under the doctrine of res
ipsa locquitor, Latin for “the thing speaks for itself."128 When this type of
negligence is alleged, the plaintiff need not show any lack of due care on
the part of the defendant, but instead must show that the fact the accident
occurred alone constitutes negligence for which the defendant is strictly
liable.129 Nigerian courts have found for plaintiffs, holding Shell-BP liable
in res ipsa locquitor negligence cases involving environmental damage.130
Thus, the Kiobel Petitioners could have remedies in the form of settlement,
monetary damages, or injunctive relief for a variety of tortious theories,
including ordinary negligence and strict liability.131
B. Avenues for Relief in Nigeria Based on Nigerian and International
Human Rights Law
Nigerian human rights law also provides a viable avenue for holding
Shell accountable for their violations against the Kiobel Petitioners. In the
landmark decision of Gbemere v. Shell, the plaintiffs claimed
oil exploration and production activities of Shell which led to
incessant gas flaring . . . violated their right to life and dignity of
the human person under sections 33(1) and 34(1) of the
[Nigerian] Constitution, and articles 4, 16, and 24 of the African
Charter [on Human and People’s Rights].132
The plaintiffs in Gbemere were successful in their suit against Shell
Nigeria, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, and the attorney
general of the federation “under the fundamental rights enforcement
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. a (1965).
129. Id. § 328D cmt. e.
130. AMAO, supra note 119, at 130 (citing Mons v. Shell-BP, [1970-1972] 1 RSLR 71
(Nigeria)).
131. While this section only explored a few remedies under Nigerian tort law. Claimants
have also had success against multi-national oil companies for violations under the Rule in
Rylands v. Fletcher. See Umudje v. Shell-BP, [1975] 9-11 SC 155 (Nigeria) (holding that
Rylands v. Fletcher applies where the plaintiffs claim that materials from Shell’s waste pit
escaped unto the plaintiff’s farms, ponds, and lakes). But see Shell Petroleum Dev. Corp.
(Nig) Ltd. v. Amaro, [2000] 10 NWLR 248 (C.A.) (Nigeria) (finding the defendants are not
liable under Rylands v. Fletcher because the establishment of a crude oil pipeline on land
with potential of escape or spill was not a natural use of the land).
132. AMAO, supra note 119, at 139 (citing Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. Nigeria,
Ltd., No. FHC/B/CS/53/05 (F.H.C. Nov. 14, 2005) (Nigeria)).
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procedure in the Nigerian Constitution . . . .”133 The Nigerian federal high
court held the Nigerian Constitution protects the “rights to clean, poisonfree, pollution-free environment.”134
Gbemere confirms that claims can be brought under the African Charter
on Human and People’s Rights where no such claim exists under Nigerian
national law.135 The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights is one
of multiple international human rights law provision that provide another
avenue for relief for the Kiobel Petitioners.
Nigeria is currently a member of various international treatises including
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading
Treatment or Punishment; and the African Charter on Human and People’s
Rights.136 As a member to these organizations, Nigeria is subject to
sanctions for human rights violations, which provides another avenue of
relief for the Kiobel Petitioners and for similarly situated plaintiffs. In
addition to this, as Gbemere implies, Nigerian courts have a greater
incentive to enforce fundamental rights when a plaintiff’s claims violate
both domestic law and an international treatise.
Should the Kiobel Petitioners seek redress in Nigerian courts, their
claims would have the greatest force if coupled with a claim under the
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights. “Nigeria has ratified nine
of the 13 core current international human rights treatises in force . . . .” 137
However, Nigeria has failed to ratify necessary provisions to give make
give these treatises full effectiveness.138
The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights provides many
relevant provisions to the claims of the Kiobel Petitioners, including Article
5, which protects human dignity by preventing “[a]ll forms of exploitation
and degradation particularly . . . torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading . . .
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 136–37.
Id. at 136.
Id. For example,
Nigeria has not signed the optional protocol on the Convention against Torture
(2002) and does not recognize the competence of the Committee against
Torture to receive communications from individuals under article 22 of the
convention. Also, Nigeria has not taken its reporting obligations under the
treaties seriously. Its reports have been few and far between.
Id. (citing Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee: Nigeria 16/09/95, UN Doc. A/51/40, para. 42 (1997)).
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treatment . . . .”139 Article 21 provides “[i]n case of spoliation the
dispossessed people shall have the right to the lawful recovery of its
property as well as to an adequate compensation.”140 Article 21 also ensures
Nigerian citizens protection against foreign companies such as Shell,
prescribing that “States parties to the present Charter shall undertake to
eliminate all forms of foreign economic exploitation . . . so as to enable
their peoples to fully benefit from the advantages derived from their
national resources.”141
The African Charter has been formally incorporated into the Nigerian
domestic law,142 and “can be enforced through the procedure provided
under the Nigerian Constitution.”143 However, the text of the Charter
provides its own sanctions for any provisional breaches. Article 47 requires
all participating states to report any actions, which may violate the
Charter’s provisions.144 If the violating parties do not reconcile their actions
within a certain time frame, the Charter will make a formal report of the
finding, subjecting the violating nation to international scrutiny.145
The Nigerian government might also be subject to accountability under
the International Labour Organisation’s Convention 169 (ILO 169). The
International Labour Organisation is a specialized agency of the UN and
sets international standards by adopting conventions, recommendations, and
strategies for their implementation.146 The provisions of ILO 169 are unique
in that they promote the advancement and protection of indigenous
populations.147 It stipulates, “wherever possible[;]148 [indigenous groups]
139. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, AFRICA COMM’N ON HUMAN &
PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, art. 5, http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/ (last visited May 10,
2014).
140. Id. at art. 21.
141. Id.
142. AMAO, supra note 119, at 137 (citing 21 I.L.M. 58 (1981)).
143. Id. (quoting Garba v. Lagos State Attorney Gen., Suit ID/599m/91 (Oct. 31, 1991)
(Nigeria), and Agbakoba v. Director State Sec. Servs., [1994] 6 NWLR (Pt 351) 475
(Nigeria)).
144. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note 139, at art. 47.
145. Id. at art. 52.
146. See, e.g., BRIGITTE FEIRING, INT’L LABOUR ORG., INDIGENOUS AND TRIBAL PEOPLES’
RIGHTS IN PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO ILO CONVENTION NO. 169 (2009), available at
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---normes/documents/publication/wcms
_106474.pdf.
147. The ILO is designed to protect the rights of indigenous people groups such as the
Ogonis by “stimulat[ing] a dialogue between governments and indigenous and tribal
peoples.” Convention No. 169, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/indigenous/Conven
tions/no169/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2013).
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shall participate in the benefit of . . . [resource exploitation] and receive a
fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of
such activities.”149 Thus, once ratified, the provisions of ILO 169 provide a
means to further pressure the Nigerian government to protect the rights of
indigenous people, as well as allow for compensation for damages of the
exploration activities.150
C. Avenues for Relief in Nigeria on Environmental Law Violations
The Kiobel petition lacked detail of the environmental damage suffered
as a result of Shell’s operations.151 However, petroleum exploitation in the
Niger Delta (where Ogoniland is located) has greatly degraded the
community’s environment.152 When oil is produced through improper
methods, “forests are destroyed . . . leading to deforestation, noise
pollution, threat to marine life, erosion and loss of vegetation and
biodiversity.”153 In addition, oil production causes “air pollution, pipeline
leakages, operational and accidental spills from well blow-outs, gas flaring,
and venting, [which] result in harmful consequences on the people’s health,
environment,
infrastructural
development
and
socio-economic
livelihood.”154 As a result, Nigeria has enacted legislation to regulate the
148. The “wherever possible” language of the provision may greatly limit the
effectiveness of ILO 169. This language “casts a sore point on this right as it could serve as
an alibi for government to renege on its responsibilities.” ADEBOLA OGUNLADE, PETROLEUM
EXPLOITATION AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ (IP) RIGHTS IN NIGERIA: CAN THE INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR ORGANISATION (ILO) CONVENTION 169 HELP? at 20 (2010).
149. Id.
150. Nigeria has been a member of the ILO since 1969, but only enforces thirty-four of
the thirty-eight provisions that it ratified. Id. at 21.
151. The petitioners did originally make a claim for destruction of property. See Kiobel
vs. Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum Co., No. 02 Cir. 7618, 2004 WL 5719589, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 31, 2004).
152. OGUNLADE, supra note 148, at 1.
153. Id. In a Shell Internal Position Paper, it was reported that 56.4km2 of mangrove
forest had been destroyed by Shell in Rivers State of Nigeria during seismic operations in
1995. See J.P. Van Dessel, The Environmental Situation in the Niger Delta 15 (Feb. 1995)
(internal position paper); see also Shell-BP v. Usoro [1960] SCNLR 121 (Nigeria);
Seismograph Serv. v. Mark, [1993] 7 NWLR (Pt 304) 203 (Nigeria).
154. OGUNLADE, supra note 148, at 1-2. “Recently, it was reported that coastal
communities near the Qua Iboe Oil Export Terminal operated by ExxonMobil experienced spill
incidents recurrently on December 4, 2009; March 24, 2010 and May 1, 2010.” Id. at 1 n.4
(citing SaharaReporters, New York, ExxonMobil Oil Spill in Niger Delta Exposes Nigerians to
Poisoned Fish, SAHARA REPORTERS, June 9, 2010, https://web.archive.org/web/2010061604
0246/http://saharareporters.com/real-news/sr-headlines/6244-exxonmobil-oil-spill-in-niger-del
ta-exposes-nigerians-to-poisoned-fish.html). “A World Bank Report stated that about 2,300m3
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drilling of multinational oil companies. For example, the Petroleum Act of
1969 require “oil licensees or lessees . . . [to] adopt all possible precautions
to prevent pollution and where it occurs or has occurred . . . take prompt
steps to control [it] and if possible end it.”155
In addition, Nigeria’s Associated Gas Re-injection Act of 1979 was
enacted to ban gas flaring.156 The act provides for strict penalties on oil
companies that fail to comply with its provisions.157 Unfortunately, there
have been several delays in the ratification of this provision, making its
enforcement impractical158 Once the act is in full effect, corporations such
as Shell will suffer penalties for gas flaring. Regardless of their
imperfections, provisions such as the Petroleum Act of 1969 and the Gas
Re-injection Act serve as additional means to hold multinational oil
companies accountable for environmental destruction under Nigerian
law.159
In sum, Nigerian law provides several modes of redress for the
Petitioners ranging from tort damages to sanctions under international law.
For relief under Nigerian tort law, Gbereme illustrates Nigerian courts have
are willing to offer injunctive relief when citizens’ human rights have been
violated. Despite the existence of these remedies, relief under Nigerian law
may have greater viability in theory than in practice. The impracticability of
relief under Nigerian law is confirmed by Nigeria’s failure to ratify multiple
provisions of domestic and international law. Further, as Mrs. Kiobel
predicted, many remedies in Nigeria may also fail to actuate in cases such
as Kiobel where the government itself played a role in the offenses.

of oil in about 300 oil spill incidents were recorded in Nigeria annually between 1991 and 1993
in Rivers and Delta States.” Id. (citing 1 WORLD BANK, DEFINING AN ENVIRONMENTAL
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FOR THE NIGER DELTA 49 (1995); 2 id. tbl. A.12, at 95; Shell v.
Farrah [1995] 3 NWLR (Pt 382) 148 (Nigeria)).
155. Id. at 12.
156. Associated Gas Re-Injection Act (1984) Cap. A2 LFN 2004.
157. OGUNLADE, supra note 148, at 12.
158. Id. Enactment dates include: Jan. 1, 1985; Jan. 1, 2004; Dec. 31, 2012.
159. Similar provisions include: (1) the Federal Environmental Protection Agency Act of
1988, which was established to “centrally administer a national environmental policy in
Nigeria. . . . [that] advocates the adoption of mechanisms to . . . prescribe operational
standards aimed at eliminating or minimizing adverse environmental effects of mineral and
oil development.” Id. at 13 (citing Federal Environmental Protection Amendment Decree
No. (59) (1992) ch. 4.11, 4.14 (Supplement to Official Gazette Extraordinary No. 68, Vol.
79, 23 December, 1992)), and (2) the Environmental Impact Assessment Decree of 1992.
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D. A Gleam of Hope: Avenues for Relief Under the Law of the Netherlands
The Kiobel Petitioners could also seek relief under the Law of the
Netherlands. Royal Dutch Shell is incorporated in the United Kingdom, and
is headquartered in the Netherlands.160 According to Kiobel, “the
defendants and representatives of the Nigerian government met in the
Netherlands in February 1993 to formulate a plan to restore the peace
necessary for defendants to resume their operations.”161 This instance alone
may be enough to link the defendants’ actions to the Netherlands. Even if
this is not the case, the Netherlands courts might be hospitable to Mrs.
Kiobel’s claims.
Dutch courts appear to be more favorable to cases against Shell
Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), for actions that took place in
Nigeria. In 2013, the Hague District Court in the Netherlands issued a
judgment against SPDC for environmental damages as a result of SPDC’s
activities in Orobiri Village, Delta State, Nigeria.162 Plaintiff Freddy Akpan
brought suit after SPDC’s oil spill “damaged 47 fishing ponds, killed all the
fish and rendered the ponds useless.”163 This ruling is said to have opened
“new avenues” for Nigerian plaintiffs against SPDC, and can offer much
hope to the Kiobel Petitioners.164 The ruling in Akpan’s case not only
“examin[ed] the role of the parent company, but also looked ‘at abuses
committed by Shell Nigeria, where the link with the Netherlands is
extremely limited’”.165
Legal provisions in the Netherlands prove to extend additional modes of
relief for the Kiobel Petitioners. The Law of the Netherlands recognizes
criminal liability for any offense in principle; “its liability is therefore no
longer restricted to the class of “economic offences.”166 The Dutch Supreme
160. Shell at a Glance, supra note 113.
161. Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 120, at 17.
162. Ivana Sekularac & Anthony Deutsch, Dutch Court Says Shell Responsible for
Nigeria Spills, REUTERS, Jan. 30, 2013, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/01/30/uk-shellnigeria-lawsuit-idUKBRE90T0DC20130130.
163. Id.
164. Id. (quoting Menno Kamminga, Professor of International Law at Maastricht
University) (“The fact that a subsidiary has been held responsible by a Dutch court is new
and opens new avenues . . . .”); id. (paraphrasing Geert Ritsema, Friends of the Earth
spokesman) (“Ritsema said hundreds of other Nigerians in the village of Icot Ada Udo,
where Farmer Friday Akpan lives, can now take similar legal action.”).
165. Id.
166. B.F. Keulen & E. Gritter, Corporate Criminal Liability in the Netherlands,
ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L., Dec. 2010 (vol. 14.3), at 3, http://www.ejcl.org/143/art143-9.pdf
(citing J. DE HULLU, MATERIEEL STRAFRECHT – OVER ALGEMENE LEERSTUKKEN VAN
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Court has established that for a corporation to be criminally liable in the
Netherlands, the conduct which gave rise to the actions in question has to
be “reasonably” imputed to the corporation.167 Conduct is reasonably
imputed to the corporation if it took place within the corporation’s scope.168
The Supreme Court of the Netherlands has “enunciatively summed up four
situations or ‘groups of circumstances’ in which conduct, in principle, may
be said to be carried out ‘within the scope of a corporation.’”169 Two
situations particularly relevant to the Kiobel Petitioners are where (1) “the
corporation gained profit from the conduct concerned” and (2) “the course
of action was at the ‘disposal’ of the corporation, and the corporation has
‘accepted’ the conduct—acceptance including the failure to take reasonable
care to prevent the conduct from being performed.”170
If Shell is found to have violated criminal law of the Netherlands, they
are subject to primary and secondary sanctions under the Dutch Penal
Code.171 A corporation disciplined under a primary sanction can be fined
for each individual violation committed.172 A corporation disciplined under
a secondary sanction could face the forfeiture of certain rights, assets, or

NEDERLANDS RECHT, VIERDE DRUK 163
(2009)).
Some scholars tend to restrict the scope of Art. 51 DPC by excluding offences
of a more physical nature, such as rape. In our opinion, a corporation can be
criminally liable, regardless of the nature of the offence. Whether a corporation
in a particular case should be prosecuted for a more physical offence like rape
or battery is another matter (please note that the Dutch prosecution service
(Openbaar Ministerie) does not operate a system recognising the principle of
mandatory prosecution, meaning that the legality principle does not apply).
Id.
167. Id. at 5.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 7.
172. Id. (“The DPC [Dutch Penal Code] sets a maximum fine for each criminal offence.
There are six categories. The first category maximum is EUR 370; the sixth category
maximum is EUR 740,000. Every criminal offence is assigned to one of the first five
categories. However, the DPC has a special provision for fines and legal persons. Where a
legal person is convicted and the applicable category does not allow for appropriate
punishment, a fine from the next higher category may be imposed (Article 23 DPC).
Therefore, if the criminal offence is assigned to the fifth category (EUR 74,000) a fine of
EUR 740,000 may be imposed on conviction of a legal person. However, the question
remains whether EUR 740,000 is an appropriate punishment in the most serious cases.”).

STRAFRECHTELIJKE AANSPRAKELIJKHEID NAAR
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publication of the verdict.173 Finally, outside of the Dutch Penal Code,
corporations committing criminal offenses may be sanctioned under the
Economic Offenses Act, “regarding specified criminal offenses related to
regulation of economic activities, including environmental law.”174
The Dutch Penal Code is applicable to any Dutch person who commits a
crime outside of the Netherlands, “where the act constitutes a criminal
offense according to the law of the State whose territory the crime was
committed.”175 Shell’s actions in Nigeria constituted human rights
violations under the Nigerian constitution, tort law, and international law.
Thus, the actions which gave rise to Kiobel in Nigeria could be a basis for
liability under Dutch law, provided that any Dutch citizens were directly
involved in enforcing the criminal offenses in Nigeria. Alternatively, if the
actions of Shell Nigeria can be directly attributable to Shell in the
Netherlands, Shell could also be subject to Dutch law.
The first of two options requires showing that a Dutch citizen is directly
involved in enforcing the criminal offenses in Nigeria. Although this would
be the easiest way to satisfy the requirements under Dutch law, it places a
heavier evidentiary burden on the Kiobel Petitioners. This claim requires
the names of individual Dutch actors who played a role in aiding and
abetting the Nigerian government in harming the Petitioners. This
information could, however, be in Mrs. Kiobel’s possession, as she has
openly offered to share private documents including affidavits of key
witnesses and other relevant case documents.176
The second option would be to show that the actions of Shell Nigeria are
directly attributable to Shell in the Netherlands. In other words, under the
second option, Shell as the parent company would be accountable for
SPDC’s actions. Unless a pure vicarious liability theory could prevail, the
Kiobel Petitioners would also have the burden of proving that Shell had
actual or constructive knowledge of SPDC’s violative practices in
Ogoniland.
Regardless of the theory by which Shell of the Netherlands is criminally
liable for the actions which gave rise to Kiobel, Shell might still be able to
173. Id. “Publication of the verdict can be a very effective sanction but is not often
imposed, perhaps because the media attention surrounding the prosecution will usually
already done a lot of damage to the legal person.” Id. (citing Court of Rotterdam 13 June
2000, LJN: AA6189).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Esther Kiobel is cited to have offered to disclose materials to rebut claims that Shell
had no financial relationship with the Nigerian military.
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raise a defense to excuse them from culpability. Under the Dutch Penal
Code, Shell could raise any available defense allowed under Dutch criminal
law.177 Their strongest defense against the conduct in Nigeria would be a
lack of sufficient culpability, which also requires specific important
grounds for exculpation such as a showing of due diligence.178 Again, the
feasibility of vindication on these grounds hinges on the level of
engagement the Dutch actors themselves had with the Nigerian government
and Shell Nigeria, and the extent to which Shell Nigeria’s offenses can be
attributed to them.
If the Kiobel Petitioners cannot successfully bring a claim in the
Netherlands, then Shell of the Netherlands could still face a direct or
derivative liability suit from its shareholders. The Dutch civil code requires
“managing directors to fulfil [sic] their duties towards the legal entity with
due care and attention.”179 If they fail to fulfill this duty, the managing
directors of the company are personally responsible for any damage caused
to the company as a result.180 Similar to a derivative liability suit in the
United States, Dutch law requires showing that Shell’s directors engaged in
“serious misconduct.”181 The Dutch Supreme Court has found the actions of
managing directors to amount to serious misconduct in situations where a
reasonably prudent manager acting in a similar circumstance would not take
the same measures.182 Examples of this type of conduct include engaging in
fraud or illegal conduct.183 Thus, depending on Royal Dutch Shell’s
involvement in SPDC’s human rights violations in Ogoniland, its chief
officers may be liable to its shareholders for their role in the actions that led
to the Kiobel complaint.
E. Avenues for Relief Under United Kingdom Law
Royal Dutch Shell’s registered office is in London, United Kingdom.184
Given this presence in the United Kingdom, the Kiobel Petitioners could
seek relief under the law of the United Kingdom. Ongoing developments in

177. Keulen & Gritter, supra note 166, at 6.
178. Id.
179. Liability of Directors, LEEMAN VERHEIJDEN HUNTJENS, http://www.kernkamp.nl/en/
services/company-and-corporate-law/personal-liability-of-directors-in-the-netherlands/ (last
visited Dec. 14, 2013).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Shell at a Glance, supra note 113.
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United Kingdom case law could make United Kingdom courts more
hospitable to claims against SPDC.
Recent developments in the United Kingdom case law offer hope for the
Kiobel Petitioners. The High Court of London is set to hear an oil spill case
by 11,000 Nigerian citizens of the Bodo community against SPDC.185 The
Bodo community plaintiffs allege that SPDC spilled 500,000 barrels of oil
in 2008.186 Shell has admitted liability for two of the spills, but maintains
that the amount of oil spilled is less than the Bodo community alleges.187
Akin to the Netherlands courts, the actions of Shell’s parent company
have not been challenged in the United Kingdom.188 In Bodo, SPDC
admitted liability in return for the dismissal of its parent company’s
liability.189 The Financial Times projects Bodo will payout at $400 million,
a number Shell maintains is “highly over-exaggerated.”190 Regardless of the
case’s settlement, this action seems to show a positive shift in United
Kingdom courts towards actions against SPDC.
Reform in European Law also supports a positive shift towards liability
against multi-national companies for actions taking place outside of the
United Kingdom. In 2005, the European Court of Justice191 (ECJ)
effectively abolished forum non-conveniens.192 The ECJ “interpreted the
Brussels I regulation on jurisdiction to require courts in each European
185. Bodo Cmty. v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. of Nigeria, [2012] EWHC (QB)
HQ11X01280 (Nigeria); Michael D. Goldhaber, U.K. Shell Deal Spotlights Value of Common
Law Model for Human Rights Litigation, ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC.COM (Aug. 31, 2011),
http://royaldutchshellplc.com/2011/08/31/u-k-shell-deal-spotlights-value-of-common-law-mod
el-for-human-rights-litigation/.
186. Erik Larson, Shell Sued in U.K. over ‘Massive’ 2008 Nigerian Oil Spills,
BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Mar. 23, 2012, 12:02 PM CDT), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2012-03-23/shell-sued-in-u-k-over-massive-oil-spills-in-nigeria-in-2008.
187. Id.
188. Michael D. Goldhaber, Corporate Human Rights Litigation in Non-U.S. Courts: A
Comparative Scorecard, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 127, 130 (2013) [hereinafter Goldhaber,
Corporate Human Rights Litigation].
189. Id.
190. Id. (quoting Sylvia Pfeifer & Jane Croft, Shell’s Nigeria Pay-Out Could Top £250m,
FIN. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2011, 7:21 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4209f536-bde8-11e0ab9f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3TyY3nxLG).
191. The European Court of Justice interprets European Union (EU) Law and ensures its
proper application. In addition to this, the ECJ decides legal disputes between EU
governments and institutions, or any claim against an EU. Court of Justice of the European
Union, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice/index_
en.htm (last visited Aug. 14, 2014).
192. Id.
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nation to assert jurisdiction over corporations that are domiciled or centrally
administered in the EU.”193 Consequently, the Kiobel Petitioners could seek
redress in United Kingdom courts.
III. Increasing Transparency Between Oil Companies and Nigerian
Citizens
Another key concern raised by the Kiobel decision is the proper means of
interaction between international oil companies, such as Shell, and the
indigenous communities in which they operate. Perhaps the greatest insult
to Nigeria’s existence is despite its vast potential revenue from oil
production, its citizens—particularly in the Niger Delta where the majority
of Nigeria’s oil and gas is produced—have yet to reap any of the benefits of
production.194 At the heart of the Kiobel case are Nigerian citizens
protesting the unsafe operating practices in their communities. Their
primary purpose in protesting was simply to have their voice heard. Oil
companies should take measures to reduce the harsh impact on the Nigerian
environment and to foster better relationships with Nigerian tribes.
The easiest fix to the problems leading to the protests in Kiobel would be
to provide safer operating practices. Nigeria flares 17.2 billion cubic meters
of natural gas per year in the Niger Delta.195 Gas flaring is the “burning of
natural gas from the ground."196 Residents in the Niger Delta complain of
“respiratory problems, skin rashes, and eye irritations” as a result of gas
flaring.197 The Nigerian government has responded to this problem by
passing the Associated Gas Re-Injection Act, which requires “every
company producing oil and gas in Nigeria to submit preliminary

193. Goldhaber, Corporate Human Rights Litigation, supra note 188, at 132 (quoting
Case C-281/02, Owusu v. Jackson, 2005 E.C.R. 1383 (interpreting Council Regulation
44/2001, 2000 O.J. (L12/1) (EC) “on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of
judgments in civil and commercial matters”)).
194. “Th[e] rise in oil wealth has not translated into significant increases in living
standards in Nigeria, however. In fact, the rise in poverty and inequality coincides with the
discovery and export of oil in Nigeria.” Kate Higgins, Regional Inequality in the Niger
Delta: Policy Brief No. 5, OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT INST., http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.
org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/3383.pdf (last visited May 19, 2014).
195. Anslem O. Ajugwo, Negative Effects of Gas Flaring: The Nigerian Experience, SCI.
& EDUC. PUBLISHING, http://pubs.sciepub.com/jephh/1/1/2/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2013).
196. Id.
197. Nigeria: Gas Flares Still a Burning Issue in the Niger Delta, IRN NIGERIA (Mar. 8,
2012), http://www.irinnews.org/report/95034/nigeria-gas-flares-still-a-burning-issue-in-theniger-delta.
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programmes for gas re-injection and detailed plans for implementation of
gas re-injection.”198
Unfortunately, little has been done to actually enforce this act. Gas
flaring renders communities uninhabitable. Contaminants from gas flaring
can “acidify the soil,” depleting its nutrients.199 This destroys the livelihood
of the villagers who depend on agriculture for subsistence.
Nigerian law requires oil companies to either save or re-inject natural gas
into the subsurface to eliminate the need for flaring.200 When gas is reinjected into the ground, it increases the reservoir pressure and ultimately
enhances oil recovery.201 However, gas flaring is less expensive than reinjection, and many of Nigeria’s reservoirs make re-injection difficult.202
Another alternative to gas flaring is to collect, process, and sell the gas to
international markets.203 This alternative benefits international oil
companies while eliminating the harsh effects of flaring. However, like reinjection, selling excess gas may not be feasible in Nigeria. Unfortunately,
there is not as great of enough market for buying gas to offset costs of
creating the requisite infrastructure to sell gas.204
Apart from safer drilling practices, such as gas re-injection, events that
gave rise to Kiobel could be prevented with increased communication
between oil companies and indigenous groups such as the Ogonis. “The oil
companies in Nigeria have historically maintained the basic position that to
take a stance on human rights issues would be to interfere in the internal
politics of the country, something that would not be a legitimate activity for
a foreign commercial entity."205 An ideal system of accountability would
have to actively involve a “triad of parties: indigenous peoples, the
198. Associated Gas Re-Injection Act, POL’Y & LEGAL ADVOC. CENTRE, http://www.
placng.org/lawsofnigeria/node/26 (last visited Dec. 16, 2013).
199. Ajugwo, supra note 195.
200. Ashley Palomaki, Flames Away: Why Corporate Social Responsibility Is Necessary
to Stop Excess Natural Gas Flaring in Nigeria, 24 COLO. NAT. RESOURCES, ENERGY &
ENVTL. L. REV. 499, 507 (2013) (citing Global Gas Flaring Reduction Initiative: Report on
Consultations with Stakeholders 8 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 27275, 2004)).
201. Id. at 504 (citing INT’L ASS’N OF OIL & GAS PRODUCERS, REPORT NO. 2.79/288,
FLARING & VENTING IN THE OIL & GAS EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION INDUSTRY: AN
OVERVIEW OF PURPOSE, QUANTITIES, ISSUES, PRACTICES, AND TRENDS 8 (2000)).
202. Id. at 507.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. The Roles and Responsibilities of the International Oil Companies, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria/Nigew991-10.htm (last visited Jan. 8,
2014).
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corporate or business actor engaged in the project, and the government
which grants the corporate actor rights over the lands or resources at
issue.”206
The U’wa tribe of Columbia and the Canadian based company
Occidental Petroleum provide an imperfect example for facilitating
cooperation between indigenous tribes, government, and multinational oil
companies.207 Under the U’wa tribe’s model, exploration licenses cannot be
granted to any major oil company without first consulting the U’wa tribe.208
This level of autonomy for the U’wa tribe was made possible after several
years of Columbian constitutional reform.209 As of 1991, indigenous people
in Columbia now fully possess ownership over traditional lands and
resources.210
The U’wa example is imperfect for Nigeria because the Nigerian
government owns all of the land and oil resources in Nigeria.211 The
Nigerian government may be unwilling to yield this power to indigenous
groups. Despite this, the Nigerian government could benefit from
borrowing the U’wa prior consultation system. As owners of the resources,
the Nigerian government would still have the ultimate say. However,
creating a forum for indigenous groups to voice their grievances could lead
to more peaceful relations between oil companies and local communities.
Conclusion
Kiobel vs. Royal Dutch Petroleum held that the presumption against
extraterritoriality applies to the ATS, and can only be displaced where
claims asserted under the ATS “touch and concern the territory of the
United States . . . with sufficient force.”212 The Kiobel decision begged
many questions, including: (1) under which circumstances can a future ATS
claim meet the Kiobel requirements; (2) what can be done to ease tensions
between indigenous groups and multi-national companies to prevent the
206. Lillian Aponte Miranda, The U’Wa and Occidental Petroleum: Searching for
Corporate Accountability in Violations of Indigenous Land Rights, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
651, 655 (2006-2007).
207. Id. at 651.
208. Id. at 656.
209. Id. at 657.
210. Id.; see Charles H. Roberts, U’wa vs. Oxy, COVERT ACTION Q., Summer 2002,
available at http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Oil_watch/U%27Wa_Oxy.html.
211. See Trustec Oil & Gas, Inc. v. W. Atlas Int’l, Inc., 194 S.W. 3d 580, 582 n.5 (Tex.
App. 2006).
212. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
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alleged atrocities in Kiobel; and (3) do any avenues for relief exist outside
of the United States for the Kiobel petitioners?
The first major concern raised by Kiobel is the touch and concern
requirement. This language left lower courts and legal scholars alike
scrambling to predict if and when a case can meet these requirements or if
the ATS lives on after Kiobel. The district courts have offered that a claim
by an alien plaintiff against a US citizen defendant, for actions which took
place in the United States, yet caused harm outside of the United States is
sufficient to displace the ATS’ presumption against extraterritoriality.
Although the Supreme Court dismissed the Kiobel Petitioners’ claims,
the Kiobel Petitioners may still pursue several avenues of relief outside of
the United States. Shell may still be liable under Nigerian law, the law of
the Netherlands, and the law of the United Kingdom.
Under Nigerian Law, the Kiobel respondents could be liable for violating
domestic tort law, domestic environmental law, human rights law, and
International human rights law. However, many of the remedies under
Nigerian law prove to be more sound in theory than in practice. The Kiobel
petitioners will likely be prejudiced in Nigerian courts for domestic law
claims against the Nigerian government and oil giant, Shell. In addition to
this, environmental provisions such as the Gas Re-Injection Act are
unenforceable, as they have yet to be fully enacted. Finally, Nigeria has yet
to ratify many of the International provisions, such as ILO 169, which could
provide greater accountability for the Nigerian government and
multinational corporations.
The second major concern raised by Kiobel is what mechanisms can
multinational oil companies employ to prevent similar causes of action in
the future. Suits such as Kiobel can certainly be prevented by improving
transparency levels between oil companies, the Nigerian government, and
indigenous groups such as the Ogoni tribe. Nigeria could greatly benefit
from fashioning a system similar to that of the U’wa tribe of Colombia.
This type of system would likely improve relations between multinational
oil companies and indigenous groups.
Fortunately for Mrs. Kiobel, the answer to the final major question raised
by Kiobel—what avenues for relief remain after the Kiobel ruling—has a
simpler remedy. Recent developments in the laws of both the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom offer hope for redress for the Kiobel petitioners.
Both the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are becoming more
hospitable to claims brought against local based corporations such as Shell
for actions which occurred in Nigeria. Mrs. Kiobel could have a viable
claim under the law of the Netherlands or the United Kingdom. Thus, for
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her purposes she need not “touch” the territory of the United States with
any force in order to gain the relief she has sought for over a decade.
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